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Abstract 
This comment reexamines the problem of free-riding in pre-emptive collective environmental voluntary agreements 
(VA) analysed by Dawson and Segerson in the context of VAs with a global emission target and a pigouvian tax used 
as a threat. Completely remaining in the authors' framework, we here reconsider their results about efficiency. While 
they claim it provides the optimal amount of environmental quality but inefficiently, we show that there exists an 
optimal threat under which the equilibrium of the game is a cost-effective VA. This result gives an additional indication 
on the way VAs should be used to be efficient.
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     1. Introduction
Collective VAs refer to commitments of groups of ﬁrms, possibly an entire industry, to cutting volun-
tarily their polluting emissions. These commitments are not directly required by law but they may be
used by ﬁrms to preempt the implementation of a coming enactment and get some costs advantages in
the form of regulatory gains 1. A problem of preemptive collective VAs is that there may be, inside the
group of ﬁrms which are a ected by the coming law, an incentive to free-ride on other ﬁrms’ preemptive
e orts. Namely, it is the case when the sanction is not deﬁned individually but collectively, that is
when the implementation of the law threat depends on the global voluntary emission reduction e ort
and not on private voluntary e orts.
In a recent paper, Na Li Dawson and Kathleen Segerson (Dawson and Segerson, 2008) point out (as
have others before them, such as Millock and Salani´ e, 2000; Lyon, Maxwell and Hackett, 2000; Brau,
Carraro and Golfetto, 2000) that these free-riding phenomena may play a crucial role in the emergence
of VAs and their e ciency.
In Millock and Salanie (2000), compensation between individual e orts is assumed to be impossible.
Therefore one single ﬁrm not meeting its own voluntary commitment is enough to cause environmental
ine ectiveness. In the frameworks of Lyon, Maxwell and Hackett (2000) and Brau, Carraro and Golfetto
(2000), compensation between individual e orts is possible, but it is not always proﬁtable for ﬁrms.
Consequently, free-riding may result again in under provision of the public good. If we want VAs to be
environmental e ective despite free-riding phenomena, compensation between individual e orts must
not only be possible, but also proﬁtable. Note then that the proﬁtability of making up for free-riders
relies on the common sanction which would be implemented in case of environmental ine ectiveness.
In Dawson and Segerson (2008), the threat is a pigouvian tax set at a level such that the sum of ﬁrms
emissions equalizes an exogenous target E. The authors ﬁnd that, at the equilibrium, a group of ﬁrms
compensate for the absence of e ort of other ﬁrms because it is more proﬁtable for her than paying
the pigouvian tax. But, while environmental e ectiveness is indeed guaranted by the pigouvian tax,
a problem of cost ine ciency appears since at the equilibrium only a sub-group of ﬁrms with concave
costs functions share the depollution burden.
In the present comment, we show that the cost ine ciency in Dawson and Segerson (2008) comes
from the fact that the tax threat is exogenously set through E. We suggest to make the tax threat
endogenous. Especially, we suggest to set it at some lower level such that compensation is no more
proﬁtable but doing the reduction e ort is still better for the ﬁrms than the implementation of the tax.
This weaker threat, that we call ’optimal’, solves the problem of ine ciency stressed by Dawson and
Segerson (2008).
The model of Dawson and Segerson as well as their main conclusions will be presented in the next
section. In section 3, we establish the existence of an optimal threat such that there is no free-riding
at the equilibrium and derive a normative result. Section 4 concludes.
2. An overview of Dawson and Segerson’s model
N symmetric ﬁrms producing a good and pollutant emissions are engaged in Cournot competition.
They interact with a regulator in order to choose between a voluntary and a mandatory regulation
scheme. The mandatory scheme is a per unit pigouvian tax, ﬁxed at a level tpig, such that the sum of
all ﬁrms’ emissions equalizes a cap set by the regulator. The voluntary scheme let the ﬁrms voluntarily
and collectively meet the cap.
Dawson and Segerson (2008) represent this interaction by the following game. In a ﬁrst step, each ﬁrm
decides if it participates to the VA. The coalition of participating ﬁrms must be self-enforced at the
equilibrium, that is the coalition must be proﬁtable as well as internally and externally stable. If no
ﬁrm wants to participate, the negociation fails and the regulator sets a pigouvian tax such that the
sum of all ﬁrms’ emissions equalizes the target E. If at least one ﬁrm wants to participate, each non-
participating ﬁrms chooses non-cooperatively the amount of emission that maximizes its proﬁt while
1each participating ﬁrm chooses the quantity of emission which both maximizes its proﬁt and ensures
that the common target is met. In a third and last step, ﬁrms compete in a Cournot market.
Let  ((ei)N
i=1) be the indirect proﬁt function under VA of the N symmetric ﬁrms for given emissions
levels, where ei is the level of emissions of ﬁrm i. To determine the optimal levels of emissions, Dawson
and Segerson distinguish participating from non-participating ﬁrms and study Nash equilibria of the
game, restricting themselves to equilibria within groups. They get an indirect proﬁt function for each
type of ﬁrms, depending on the number of participating ﬁrms. For the rest of the present note, the
indirect proﬁt functions of participating and non-participating ﬁrms, for a given number of participating
ﬁrms, will be respectively denoted by  p(Np) and  n(Np), where Np is the number of participating ﬁrms.
Remark 1. A special case of interest is the case with no regulation. Let eLF be the level of emission





As a ﬁnal step of the backward-solving, it remains for the authors to identify values of Np such that
the VA is self-enforcing. Let C(yi,e i) be the cost function of the ﬁrm i and yi its level of production.
C(yi,e i) is increasing in yi, decreasing in ei and continuous. Before moving to the end of the solving,
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Remark 2. In particular, the separability assumption implies that the indirect proﬁt function of par-
ticipating ﬁrms for a given Np, is increasing in Np.
Indeed, separability entails that Np has only an impact on participating ﬁrms’ proﬁts through the
direct e ect on their emissions choices while all other e ects of Np on ﬁrms’ proﬁts, ie. the direct e ect
on non-participants’ emission choices and the indirect e ects through production levels of participating
and non-participating ﬁrms, disappear.
Now, still following Dawson and Segerson, let call NŁ
p the smallest number of participants necessary
to make the VA proﬁtable for participating ﬁrms. If  p(1)    pig, then NŁ
p = 1. If not, NŁ
p is the level
of Np such that
 p(N
Ł
p)    
pig and  p(N
Ł
p   1) < 
pig (3)
where  pig is the proﬁt that ﬁrms get under the pigouvian tax. Note that – and we would like to stress
this point – in Dawson and Segerson (2008), this level of alternative proﬁt is a constant exogenously
ﬁxed. Indeed, it is the level of proﬁt made by ﬁrms when their emissions are taxed at the level tpig
per unit, where we recall that tpig is the level of tax which ensures that the sum of all ﬁrms’ emissions
equalizes the cap exogenously set by the regulator.
Dawson and Segerson demonstrate then that a coalition of Np participating ﬁrms is a self-enforcing
equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily if and only if Np = NŁ
p (see proposition 2 in
Dawson and Segerson (2008) for the proof).
Such a NŁ
p and thus such an equilibrium always exist, with 1   NŁ
p   N (See proposition 1 in
Dawson and Segerson (2008) for the proof).
It is not necessarily the only self-enforcing equilibrium though : Np = 0 is a self enforcing equilibrium
under which the target is not met voluntarily if and only if  Ł
p(1)   tpig. (See proposition 4 in Dawson
and Segerson (2008) for the proof). But this equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the equilibrium under
which the target is met so it might be expected that ﬁrms doesn’t choose it.
These results induce Dawson and Segerson to claim that a VA is always implemented at the
equilibrium and the good level of environmental quality provided, but not all the ﬁrms participate.
Firms being symmetric and cost functions strictly concave, the abatement burden should be equally
2shared for the social costs to be minimized. Hence they conclude that the persistence of free-riding
makes collective VAs cost ine ective. In the present note we make the comment that this result comes
directly from the fact that, in Dawson and Segerson’s model, the level of alternative proﬁt that ﬁrms
take into account in their participation decisions is considered as ﬁxed while actually it depends on
the level of tax chosen by the authorities. We argue then that the problem of cost ine ciency can be
bypassed if the level of tax threat is considered as an optimization variable.
3. The optimal threat
We have just seen that, for a given E, the level of alternative proﬁt intervenes as a constant in the
determining of the minimum number of ﬁrms necessary to make the VA proﬁtable for participating
ﬁrms – Proposition 2 in Dawson and Segerson (2008). Indeed, for the authors, it is the level of proﬁt
that ﬁrms get under the pigouvian tax and the minimum number derived is then NŁ
p which is less than
N. Now, let consider it as a variable, so the minimum number of participating ﬁrms becomes a function
of the alternative proﬁt level. This level of alternative proﬁt depending on the tax level, we suggest
that there must exist a tax level inducing that the smallest number of participants necessary to make
the VA proﬁtable for participating ﬁrms is N. For the following of the present note, we call  opt the
level of alternative proﬁt such that the minimum participation level is full participation. By deﬁnition,
 opt satisﬁes
 p(N)    
opt and  p(N   1) < 
opt (4)
Now, let denote by  (t) the indirect proﬁt function under tax for given level of taxes. It is the objective
function  ((ei)N
1 )   tei, evaluated at the optimal emissions level, ie. at the symetric Nash equilibrium
of the game in emission under tax.
Lemma 1. There always exists a level of tax, denoted topt, such that the smallest number of participants
necessary to make the VA proﬁtable for participating ﬁrms is equal to N.
PROOF. By construction, given that C(ei,y i) is decreasing in ei, and  p(Np) increasing in Np, we
have
lim
t ! 0 (t)= (e




on one hand, and
 p(N)    p(N
Ł
p)    (t
pig) (6)
on the other hand. Coupled with the continuity of  (t), the fact that  p(N) belongs to the interval
[ (t = 0), (tpig)], ensures the existence of a tax level, topt, such that  (t)= opt. QED
For this result to be of interest, we still have to establish that when t = topt, the smallest number of
participants necessary to make the VA proﬁtable for participating ﬁrms does remain the equilibrium of
the game.
Proposition 1. When the tax threat is set at topt, the grand coalition is a self-enforcing equilibrium
under which the target is met voluntarily.
PROOF. Proﬁtability and extern stability are trivially satisﬁed by the grand coalition. Let us show
that the grand coalition is internally stable as well. If one single ﬁrm or a subgroup deviates, it is no
more proﬁtable to participate for the remaining ﬁrms (by deﬁnition,  opt is greater than  p(N   1))
and the VA fails. The tax topt is subsequently enforced and deviating ﬁrms make less proﬁt than when
they participated since they get the same proﬁt than before tax, but now have to pay E
N   topt . QED
3Thus, we have found how to induce full-participation in collective VAs with a global emission target
and a tax used as a threat. Now, let mention two appealing consequences of Proposition 1.
Corrolary 1. tpig   topt
PROOF. Note that N   NŁ
p. Then, by deﬁnition of  pig and  opt, it implies that  opt    pig. Since
 (t) is decreasing in t, we have that tpig   topt. QED
So an interesting feature of the tax level inducing full-participation is that it is smaller than the
pigouvian tax. Actually, by seting a lower tax level than the one which ensures that E is reached at
the tax equilibrium, we make proﬁt under tax higher and therefore drive up the number of participants
necessary to make the coalition proﬁtable. The underlying general idea is that in collective pre-emptive
VA with incentives to free-ride and free-riding undermining the proﬁt of participating ﬁrms under
the VA, we have to make the comparison allocation high enough so that the absence of free-riding is
necessary for participants to get regulatory gains from the VA. Although this optimal level of tax is not
the pigouvian one, it is credible if we assume that the governement is bound to implement the announced
threat when the target is not met 2. And this assumption could even be relaxed without calling the
credibility of topt into question. Indeed, in a world in which demanding mandatory environmental
regulation are still quite di cult to implement due to political processes and interest groups3, it seems
reasonnable to say that to threaten to implement a low tax level is more credible than to threaten to
implement a higher one.
A second consequence to be stressed is about the e ectiveness of the VA.
Corrolary 2. When the tax threat is set at topt, the cost of meeting the aggregate reduction emission
goal is minimized.
Indeed, since the N symetric ﬁrms participate at the equilibrium, the distribution of reduction emis-
sions is uniform, which, associated with the concavity of the cost function, ensures that the aggregate
emission target is met at least cost. Thus, while Dawson and Segerson (2008) concludes with the cost
e ciency loss generated by the inequal sharing of abatment between ﬁrms, we suggest, in the present
note, that this problem can be controled by considering the tax level as an optimization variable.
4. Conclusion
In this note we have used Segerson and Dawson’s positive analysis of free-riding in collective environ-
mental VA to derive a result with an important implication for policy design. Indeed, we have shown
that a tax set at the level necessary to ensure that the emissions cap would be met under the manda-
tory regulation scheme may not be the optimal threat under the VA because it does not induce full
participation and therefore cost minimization of meeting the emissions cap. Thus, in order to enhance
ﬁrms participation, the regulator should design the VA with a lower tax threat so that he increases the
minimum number of participants necessary to make the participating coalition proﬁtable.
Notes
1There is a large literature on regulatory gains derived from VAs. See David [3] for a survey.
2The authors don’t explicitly make the assumption that the threat of the government is binding, but their game do
not include further steps modeling the question of the credibility of the threat.
3See Tanguay, Lanoie and Moreau [8] for an empirical analysis on environmental policy and political processes.
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